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Journal of Progressive Human Services
ISSN: 1042-8232 (Print) 1540-7616 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wphs20
From Codes to Contextual Collaborations: Shifting
the Thinking About Ethics in Social Work
Merlinda Weinberg & Carolyn Campbell
To cite this article: Merlinda Weinberg & Carolyn Campbell (2014) From Codes to Contextual
Collaborations: Shifting the Thinking About Ethics in Social Work, Journal of Progressive Human
Services, 25:1, 37-49, DOI: 10.1080/10428232.2014.856739
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10428232.2014.856739
Published online: 21 Jan 2014.
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Journal of Progressive Human Services, 25:37–49, 2014
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1042-8232 print/1540-7616 online
DOI: 10.1080/10428232.2014.856739
From Codes to Contextual Collaborations:
Shifting the Thinking About Ethics
in Social Work
MERLINDA WEINBERG and CAROLYN CAMPBELL
School of Social Work, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
In this article, the authors argue that the current emphases in
social work on codes, standards, and decision-making models are
insufficient to the task of ensuring ethical relationships between
workers and clients. Three fundamental assumptions that underpin codes and standards are analyzed. The authors then explore
the nature of ethical relationships and demonstrate how codes and
standards, in their current form, do not address the complexity
and contextuality of the social work relationship. After considering
why the profession relies so heavily on codes and standards, they
call for a re-thinking of ethical relationships, offering ideas and
recommendations for those relationships.
KEYWORDS ethics, codes, practice, relationship, critical theory
In the modern era in social work, the use of codes of ethics, standards
of practice, and decision-making models have been the primary tools to
ensure the establishment, maintenance, and regulation of ethical relationships between workers and clients (Hugman, 2005b; Walker, 1998).Walker
(1998) argues, “The regnant type of moral theory in contemporary ethics is
a codifiable (and usually compact) set of moral formulas (or procedures for
selecting formulas) that can be applied by any agent to a situation to yield
a justified and determinate action-guiding judgment” (p. 32). However, it is
the assertion of the authors, two social work professors and practitioners,
that these mechanisms are, at best, insufficient to the task of ensuring ethical
relationships between workers and clients. We are not suggesting a complete
Address correspondence to Merlinda Weinberg, School of Social Work, Dalhousie
University, 3201-1459 LeMarchant Street, PO Box 15000, Halifax, NS B3H 4R2, Canada. E-mail:
[email protected]
37
38 M. Weinberg and C. Campbell
abandonment of codes, standards, or decision-making processes because
they represent the theoretical, codifiable principles for guiding action in
the profession (Walker, 1998). Rather, we are arguing that shifting focus
from codes and standards to the situated and contextual nature of practice
relationships will better enhance the ethical nature of social work practice.
In supporting this assertion, we first analyze some fundamental assumptions that underpin codes and standards. We then explore the nature of
ethical relationships and demonstrate how codes and standards, in their
current form, do not address the complexity and contextuality of those relationships. After briefly considering why the social work profession relies so
heavily on codes and standards, we call for a turn to an examination of
ethical relationships, offering suggestions and recommendations for ongoing
dialogue.
FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
Universal and Shared Meaning Is Possible and Desirable
Practitioners are generally advised to turn to codes and standards when they
have identified an ethical issue or dilemma within their practice. But what
is identified as an ethical dilemma is not the same for every professional.
There is no clear objective truth “out there” to which we all subscribe.
Diverse workers have differing understandings of what constitutes truth.
Every form of help has presumptions about who constitutes a client, the
nature of the problem, the goals of helping, the possible forms of practice,
the responsibilities of the helper, and the nature of the helping relationship.
The concept of discursive fields is helpful in deconstructing the concept of universal meaning. Discursive fields “consist of competing ways of
giving meaning to the world and of organizing social institutions and processes” (Weedon, 1987, p. 34). Workers have different discursive fields for
making sense of their practices that provide alternative interpretations for
understanding what help is and expose divergent underlying assumptions.
These distinctive discursive fields can lead to differing dilemmas for workers,
even those confronted with the same scenario in the same setting. For example, a worker, Rosie, who is an African-American and new employee of a
maternity home, may be told by her supervisor to watch Edna, an Aboriginal
mother, whose baby might need to be removed by Child Welfare due to
Edna’s alcohol use. But as a person of color herself, Rosie may be more
attuned to speculate that racism has influenced the supervisor’s response
to Edna, because there has not been the same level of scrutiny of white
mothers whose drinking is problematic. Yet as a new employee, she may
not feel she can resist her supervisor’s expectations, regardless of what she
believes is ethical, because of her lack of seniority in the agency. In contrast, a white employee may believe that this level of surveillance of Edna
From Codes to Contextual Collaborations 39
is entirely appropriate and sees no ethical dilemma at all. Or a more senior
white or African-American worker may feel able to address this concern with
the supervisor and/or Edna. And these interpretations will result in different
constructions of an ethical issue by each of these players. What contributes
to a worker’s discursive field for any scenario is made up of myriad factors,
but we suspect that personal values as well as social determinants, such
as race, gender, age, sexual orientation, and religion, are important components (as well as less often cited determinants such as seniority). Jayaratne,
Croxton, and Mattison (2002) argue that these aspects influence the extent
to which professional and personal cultures clash for workers, with consequent varying levels of acceptance of codes as a vehicle to assist in ethical
relationships.
The starting point in using codes and standards is the identification of
an ethical issue or dilemma. But given alternate discursive fields, any analysis
of ethics should begin at a much more fundamental level, i.e., the point at
which a worker constructs a situation as problematic. This occurs earlier in
the process than the point at which a worker can use codes and standards
for assistance.
Absolute Laws or Principles Are Possible and Desirable
Modernity has sought universal absolutist laws to guide action (Asquith &
Rice, 2005), and the current construction of ethical codes and standards
neatly supports that trend. The canonical approach to codes and standards
is a theoretical-juridical model (Walker, 1998) that utilizes abstract, linear,
universal principles and the establishment of rules. The assumption is that
by having these principles and rules and using rational, cognitively sound
approaches, one can identify what should occur in order to be a morally
upright agent. Codified rules place “high value on individualism, independence, and . . . homogeneity,” characteristics of the liberal democratic state
(Briskman, 2001). They represent a modernist approach, which includes “a
search for absolutes” (Briskman, 2001).
In contrast, we accept Walker’s (1998) critique that this search for
absolute answers or rules to guide behavior is essentially detached and
impersonal and denies the contextual nature of social work relationships,
which Finn and Jacobson (2008) define as “the background and set of circumstances and conditions that surround and influence particular events
and situations” (p. 43). Furthermore, as Orlie (1997) explains, “code-oriented
moralities tend to normalize principle because rather than continually questioning proper conduct they express a desire to find the true ground of our
being” (p. 195). Because that is not possible, a code of ethics based on a
fixed list of principles can lead to dogma, coercion, and the abdication of
personal morality and responsibility (Asquith & Rice, 2005), the opposite of
the characteristics of an ethical relation.
40 M. Weinberg and C. Campbell
Diverging and Contradictory Principles and Purposes Can Be
Reconciled
One problem with codes and standards as the primary means for resolving
ethical problems and maintaining ethical relationships is that ethical principles themselves can be competing in their importance within a particular
context (Weinberg, 2002). For example, the principle of self-determination
frequently competes with the principle of acting within the best interests of
clients. Although there have been attempts to provide guidelines around the
priority of principles (Loewenberg, Dolgoff, & Harrington, 2000), we agree
with Finn and Jacobson (2008) when they state that such systems seem to
be “informed by an implicit set of values that may be at odds with those of
the individuals and communities with whom we are engaged as social workers” (p. 143) and therefore may not be effective in helping clearly resolve
ethical dilemmas in those situations. We illustrate this issue a bit later in our
discussion.
Banks (2004) states, “A code of ethics is usually a written document produced by a professional association, occupational regulatory body or other
professional body with the stated aim of guiding the practitioners who are
members, protecting service users and safeguarding the reputation of the
profession” (p. 108). She elaborates on additional functions of codes, including: creating and maintaining professional identity, professional guidance,
and professional regulation (Banks, 2003). In an attempt to address these
multiple functions of codes, some professional organizations have chosen to
link codes with the standards-of-practice documents (Canadian Association
of Social Workers, 2005). This linkage of multiple and divergent functions is
problematic in that the distinction among very different purposes and resulting functions becomes blurred, resulting in confusion for both the public and
the practitioners. We believe that this blurring of the distinction between the
regulatory statements on which workers can be evaluated and the visionary
statements that represent inspirational ideals for professionals is confusing
and leads to constricted rather than creative practice.
To this point we have reviewed three assumptions that we believe
underpin ethical codes and standards. Grounded as they are in assumptions of the possibility of universal meaning, absolutist principles, and the
reconciliation of contradiction, we assert that these codes and standards
are insufficient in supporting and advancing our understanding of ethical
relationships.
ETHICAL RELATIONSHIPS
What constitutes an ethical relationship that codes, standards and methods are intended to support? We find Cornell’s (1992) definition the most
From Codes to Contextual Collaborations 41
useful. She suggests that it is “a nonviolative relationship to the Other . . .
that assumes responsibility to guard the Other against the appropriation that
would deny her difference and singularity” (p. 62). Nurturing such relationships is a tall order because it rests on recognizing and celebrating the
uniqueness of another human being whom we can never fully know or
understand. It asks us to step outside our own worldview and to understand
that our ways of being will influence our perceptions and our expectations
of another individual. Cornell suggests that the implication and danger of
unethical relationships is appropriation. By appropriation, she may be implying that the hazard is taking without permission, assuming possession of, or
using by pre-eminent right (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary,
1981). Such appropriation is a real possibility in a worker/client relationship, given how easily professionals can set the terms of the relationship
and define the Other (Weinberg, 2005b). When we look at the types of
responsibilities that social workers undertake in our society: apprehending
children from parents (most often mothers), or contributing to the decision
of whether someone will be detained against his/her will in a psychiatric
facility, or determining whether or not a person leaving a hospital can return
to his/her own home, we can again see the dangers of such appropriation. If we take Cornell’s definition of ethical relationships seriously, we are
charged with the dual responsibility of (a) always being cognizant of that
which makes a service user unique and to some degree, unknowable, and
(b) at the same time recognizing our power in the helping relationship and
the danger of control over, rather than care of or for.
Therefore, balancing the awareness of a service user’s matchlessness
and preserving that uniqueness and the sovereignty of that self while at the
same time knowing that we cannot always honor this uniqueness because of
the need to protect “the third” is an essential and never-ending component of
an ethical relationship. Many philosophers speak about the third (for example, Levinas, 1991), suggesting that if all of the world were just you and me,
we could work things out; but in fact, there are always other people who are
impacted by the decisions and agreements that we make between the two
of us. So if I want to protect the singularity of a mother, that seems all well
and good, but if she has a baby that is failing to thrive, and there is reason
to suspect this problem is due to a lack of care being provided, my wish
to honor the mother collides with the obligation to the third, namely, her
baby. But if I focus on the baby and protecting his or her singularity, there
are still the mother’s needs and her humanity that I may violate. Either way,
the social worker goes in her decision making, there is a third, and another
third (such as the father or grandmother or other residents in a shelter for
street-involved parents, and so forth).
These multiple responsibilities present us with a Gordian knot, an
intractable problem: society is better off with individuals (such as social
workers) who must at times be agents of control to protect those who are
42 M. Weinberg and C. Campbell
most vulnerable and cannot protect themselves, but this very necessity carries the potential of a denial of the client’s singularity and may result in
harm. But unlike the Gordian knot, there is no slicing through to a decisive and bold solution. For a variety of reasons, codes, standards, and
ethical decision-making methods, as they are currently structured and utilized, cannot capture the contextuality and complexity embedded in ethical
relationships. We explore two of those reasons here.
Difference
It is through difference that one’s singularity emerges, and the recognition
of both individual and contextual differences is essential to guard the Other
against appropriation. The ethics of relational experiences across and amid
difference cannot be legislated through a series of abstract principles. For
example, many codes and/or standards discuss the importance of avoiding
the formation of dual relationships due to the risk of boundary violations.
In the National Association of Social Workers (NASW; 2008) standards of
practice, it is stated, “Social workers should be alert to and avoid conflicts of
interest that interfere with the exercise of professional discretion and impartial judgment” (106a). Similarly, section 2.4.1 of the Canadian code reads:
“Social workers take care to evaluate the nature of dual or multiple relationships to ensure that the needs and welfare of their clients are protected”
(Canadian Association of Social Workers, 2005, p. 12).
But there are many communities in which dual relationships are an
everyday occurrence. In the context of remote and rural districts, or on
reserve, or sometimes in gay and lesbian communities, workers and their
service users may know each other intimately and have dealings in many
aspects of their lives, outside of the professional context. But the nuances of
how to negotiate this in a respectful and nonviolative way cannot be covered in the codes, even when, as in the NASW code, the statements are soft
in their approach to professionals, recognizing that some dual relationships
will arise.
Consider the Nova Scotia code and standards of practice that specifically state “social workers shall not have . . . a business relationship with the
client, borrow money from a client, [or] loan money to a client. . . .” (Nova
Scotia Association of Social Workers, 2008, 2.3.1.c., p. 13). But what if the
social worker is a First Nations individual and lives on reserve? Let us say she
is working with another First Nations service user who also lives on the reservation and whose son wants to go to university. As it happens, the worker
has been part of the council to determine whether this client’s son will be
given Band funding to attend school. Even if the social worker recuses herself from the decision, issues of confidentiality and the relationship must be
negotiated. What constitutes confidentiality on the part of a social worker on
reserve when that practitioner is also a neighbor and friend? And how does
From Codes to Contextual Collaborations 43
that worker resolve the relational issues, particularly when the service user
assumes the worker will support such a loan because it is the only hope
for the child to obtain further education? We believe that those possibilities
are a fact of life on reserve but do not preclude the prospect of an ethical
relationship and sound practice.
The complexities illustrated by this example must be thrashed out
through dialogue and, without this exchange, the codes or standards could
provide a false reassurance that following the codes will spare practitioners
from the hard effort of aiming toward that ethical relationship. Even a code
such as the Aotearoa New Zealand Association of Social Workers (2008)
code, which is bilingual, bicultural, and firmly recognizes the relationship of
the indigenous Maori people to people of European descent, cannot facilitate
this requirement for an ethical relationship. The reason for this lack is that
an ethical relationship is a process, not a product which, instead of being
impersonal and abstract, is highly personal and specific, involving affect, not
just cognition. Although the codes suggest principles to guide action, they
cannot address context, the uniqueness of the clients, or the importance of
affect on workers’ decision-making.
Feelings as Integral to an Ethical Relationship
The traditional absolutist understanding of ethics described above puts
emphasis on sound, logical thinking. This trend has existed since the
Enlightenment, when thinking and feeling were seen as being separate, with
cognition being privileged over emotion. The emphasis in codes is on impartiality, objectivity, and neutrality, perhaps in part as a historical consequence
of social work’s adoption of Freudian principles and a “scientific method”
to bolster its status and credibility as a profession (Abramovitz, 1998; Freud
& Krug, 2002). There is a gender bias in this emphasis, with men being
seen as rational and consequently “correct” in how they perceive a situation,
whereas women are seen as being emotional and their judgment clouded as
a result of those feelings. But Vetlesen (1994) argues that to see suffering is
to form an emotional bond with the other (p. 159) because emotions make
humans “attentive to how the other perceives the situation [and] link[s] our
perception of the situation to that of the other involved in it” (p. 166). He
makes the case that feelings help to alert humans to that which is significant in interpersonal relationships. It is also a primary means by which we
can empathize with “how another person experiences, perceives, and feels
in a situation” (p. 174). He suggests that feelings provide the first response
to a situation and that we then bring in thinking and judgment. But there
is little space for feelings in codes of ethics because they are based on
a deductive process in which understanding abstract principles and good
decision making are seen as being sufficient to resolve ethical problems. It is
ironic that professionals recognize the crucial importance of emotion and
44 M. Weinberg and C. Campbell
empathy in the therapeutic relationship but overlook these same tools in
moral judgment.
Given the contradictory and complex nature of ethical relationships,
the necessity of embracing and respecting difference in order to protect
the singularity of the Other, and the centrality of affect in making ethical
decisions, codes and standards are insufficient in supporting and advancing
our understanding of ethical relationships.
WHY DOES SOCIAL WORK RELY ON CODES AND STANDARDS AS
THE PRIMARY TOOL TO PROMOTE ETHICAL
RELATIONSHIPS IN PRACTICE?
Before we can explore other ways of thinking about ethics and ethical relationships, we need to consider briefly why social work professionals and
organizations are so committed to the concept of codes, standards, and
decision-making methods as the best way to promote ethical practice. Earlier
in the article we commented on the search for absolutes that is a component of social work’s modernist and positivist history. More recently the
neo-liberal environment of much of the Western world has resulted in an
attrition of the social safety net and a rise in the values of the market place
(Dominelli, 2004). The lack of certainty that accompanies the modern world
has resulted in a risk-avoidant society (Beck, 1992) that places more emphasis on procedures, assessment, and management of risk while the belief in
the autonomy and legitimacy of professional independence and judgment
has eroded. Anxiety about liability has mushroomed.
We identified that the codes meet purposes other than the protection of
service users, including guidance to practitioners. We believe one of the key
purposes of having codes and standards in a neo-liberal society has become
holding professionals responsible and consequently knowing where to place
blame. Since the Enlightenment, the individual has been valorized in Western
society with the accompanying expectations of legal responsibility for error.
Because codes are mechanisms for regulation and discipline (particularly
those that emphasize or conflate the codes with standards of practice), it is
no surprise in this atmosphere that some codes have increased the regulatory
and procedural emphases, paying lip service to social transformation while
taking us away from the lofty ambition of social justice (Mullaly, 2006), a central value of the social work profession. The principles can end up supporting
the interests of current sociopolitical agendas, which include efficiency over
quality care, resulting in loyalty to organizations over service users (Asquith
& Rice, 2005).
This problem is amplified by the dilemmas practitioners find themselves
in when professional codes of ethics are not consistent with agency codes
of conduct, a fact of life in large institutions and government positions.
From Codes to Contextual Collaborations 45
Loyalty to the organization over clients is demanded, and the expectations
of workers are to distribute scarce resources and move people through systems as quickly as possible. The provisions in the codes and standards seem
to encourage “prudence over courage” (Freud & Krug, 2002, p. 484). The
language of appropriate and reasonable action takes precedence over the
language of resistance and activism. As a result, social work has moved
toward a “rational-technical” enterprise and away from being a “practicalmoral” activity (Parton, 2000), and the emphasis on codes and standards and
their current constructions has mirrored that shift.
A CALL FOR DIALOGUE AND CONTEXTUAL COLLABORATIONS:
THINKING DIFFERENTLY ABOUT ETHICS
AND ETHICAL RELATIONSHIPS
Given the limitations of ethical codes and standards, how should social work
educators and practitioners be thinking, feeling, and acting in order to promote ethical practice and ethical relationships that are the foundation of our
work? Although we cannot provide any definitive answer to this question,
we suggest the following as potentially fruitful areas for dialogue.
First, what might be the implication of shifting our current conception
of ethical relationships from closed and static connections (Hugman, 2003),
governed by the prescriptive and contractual dictates of codes and standards,
to process-oriented and dialogical relationships, open to negotiation and
change? As Hugman (2003) states, “ethics must be concerned with ways of
achieving communication between moral selves (people) and not as a device
for dictating how any self (person) should think or act” (p. 1028). Such a shift
would ensure that context, culture, community, history, and time become
essential components of this communication and hence of ethical decision
making. This would result in a shift from resolving ethical conundrums from
a top-down worker-centered model to one that is a collaboration in context
between worker and service user.
We do recognize that such a fluid process is anxiety provoking because
there is no clear right and wrong. Such anxiety is particularly evident among
students and beginning practitioners who are eager to learn the “right” way to
practice. In part, individuals are drawn to codes to make firm that which can
never be clear-cut and to place boundaries around the infinite and unknowable. Walker (1998) opines that moral philosophers who operate from the
propositions that support a theoretical-juridical model
are apt . . . to parade fact as necessity, historical contingency as eternal
condition, norm as nature, social construction as nature’s way, endorsement as disinterested depiction, concordance among peers as objectivity
and their own often questionable positions to know as positions of
expertise, even “scientific” ones. (p. 26)
46 M. Weinberg and C. Campbell
Second, think of the possibilities if we embraced difference as the
essence and beauty of humanity; if we listened with curiosity and interest to
the worldview of the Other; if we recognized the uniqueness of all human
beings and resisted appropriation to the best of our ability. We would all be
enriched by such explorations.
Third, could the concept of ethical trespass, elaborated by Melissa Orlie
(1997) liberate us from the unrealistic idea that we must always “get it
right”? Orlie (1997) refers to ethical trespass as the “harmful effects . . . that
inevitably follow not from our intentions and malevolence but from our participation in social processes and identities” (p. 5). Orlie is arguing that all
human beings, but most especially those who are charged with the power
to shape society, are subject to ethical trespass. This happens because as
responsible agents in society, professionals set the terms of what is taken to
be health and illness, normalcy and dysfunction. For example, when a social
worker decides that Mr. Brown is not well enough to go home from the hospital, what is taken as sufficient or insufficient wellness to warrant living at
home is reinforced. And that evaluation may be wrong in Mr. Brown’s case
or could result in some other person who should go home being denied
because the norm for health has been reinforced in the case of Mr. Brown.
Or another “third” could be an individual who is turned away from the bed
in a rehabilitation hospital that Mr. Brown receives. The ripple effects are
endless and unknowable. Regardless of social workers’ attempts to act ethically, there will be unavoidable instances of harming another as a result of
those efforts. Consequently, the thinking must change from a belief in finding
the “correct” approach based on codes and standards to a recognition that
all professionals will inevitably be involved in some instances of unintended
injury (Weinberg, 2005a, 2010).
Fourth, what practice avenues would be opened if we all took greater
responsibility for engaging as morally active change agents? As a profession
we have always straddled the divide between care and control and between
fighting and supporting the status quo (Abramovitz, 1998). This entails
embracing the contradictions embedded in social work practice. We can no
longer perceive broader societal structures that support inequitable social
arrangements as political problems beyond the ken or accountability of
the professional. Professionals are severely hampered by the structural constraints under which they must operate, but the current focus in the codes
on the dyad of worker and client de-emphasizes the broader systemic problems (Weinberg, 2010). Weight needs to be placed at the macro level where,
as professionals, we confront the inequalities in society. It has been argued
that “American social work ethics [has been] insufficiently attentive to an
ethical/political basis to existing social work practice” (Hugman, 2005a,
p. 536). We must be brave in the face of restructuring and the pressures
of neo-liberalism and not succumb to the prescriptive, rule-based directions
of modern society but continue to fight for a more humane approach to
those marginalized.
From Codes to Contextual Collaborations 47
Fifth, what would arise if we shifted our focus of ethical practice from
the individual worker/client dyad to learning from our own experience
and knowledge through self-reflexivity and humility? Finn and Jacobson
(2008), adapting the work of Marcia Abramson, offer a Framework for Ethical
Self-Assessment (p. 144). This framework poses questions for workers to
consider:
What prejudgments might you bring to your work as a result of your personal
and cultural history?
What are your images of a morally good person and/or social worker? What
are your ethical principles and how do you prioritize them?
What ethical theoretical perspective informs your thinking?
What is your understanding of human nature?
What is the place of spirituality in your world view?
How do you mediate the tension between individual rights and responsibilities and the common good?
What is your moral voice?
These questions are qualitatively different from the prescriptions in our current codes and standards documents and, as such, position workers for
meaningful engagement in ethical relationships.
CONCLUSION
The dialogue that we call for here requires social workers to engage actively
in a critically reflective process, to be vulnerable, to explore instances of
ethical trespass, to grapple with contradictions, and to share their insecurities
and confusions. As social work educators who are regularly in the position
of regulating and evaluating student learning, we are only too aware of how
power dynamics can inhibit meaningful dialogue; students are reluctant to
speak their truths and fears when they are being graded. It has been our
experience that similar power dynamics influence how practitioners engage
in discussions about ethical issues: fear of reprimand by employers and/or
disciplinary action by their professional associations may be foremost in their
minds, and this fear prohibits active, honest, and engaged dialogue.
Eliminating such fear will not be a simple matter, but we believe that
clarifying the purpose and function of Codes of Ethics and Standards of
Practice could be an interim step that would enhance the much-needed
dialogue. Specifically, we recommend the following:
1. Codes of Ethics should be reconfigured as inspirational statements of
our professional values and beliefs, with no regulatory or disciplinary
functions. This would ensure a clear statement of values for the profession and for the public and serve as a visionary guide to professional
development.
48 M. Weinberg and C. Campbell
2. Standards of Practice should be separated from these inspirational statements and instead become regulatory statements of minimal practice
standards. The emphasis on minimal standards recognizes the importance of autonomy for professionals in navigating the multifaceted nature
of context and relationships. They should emphasize duty, obligation,
and procedure as well as define actions that could result in disciplinary
action. This would ensure professional accountability and protection of
the public.
3. The complex issues of contextual, process-based ethical relationships
should be addressed through mutually supportive and educational dialogical processes, distinct from any regulatory processes. This would ensure
that we can move to dialogue and re-thinking without fear of retribution.
In summary, the deductive, one-sided and top-down process currently
embedded in Codes and Standards, that spotlights the professional as if s/he
were acting alone, will never create an ethical relationship. Instead, we need
to view ethics as a relationship in process between worker and service user.
We must also recognize the structural constraints and paradoxes that are part
of the everyday experience of practitioners while we conceptualize practice
as a political activity that either reinforces inequities in society or moves
toward social transformation. A model that emphasizes collaboration and
dialogue and sees the worker not as separate but joined with a service user
must be encouraged to form a truly ethical bond. By recognizing the dangers
of trespass and appropriation while valuing the inimitability of those we
work with, we can edge toward relationships that meet our highest ethical
standards.
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